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Abstract: 
Purpose: This paper examines the evolution of political and economic institutions, their persistence 
and interdependence, and their effects on economic progress in Mozambique. 
Design/methodology/approach: Using a unique dataset, which has developed detailed long-run 
indices of institutional change in Mozambique from 1900 onwards, the research utilizes time-series 
econometrics to estimate cointegration relations and VAR and VEC models, and also Granger 
causality, correlation and residual analysis when interpreting the estimation results. 
Findings: It shows support for path dependence in political and economic institutions as well as the 
critical juncture theory and modernization hypothesis, and for webs of association between these 
institutions and economic development. It provides evidence of an equilibrium-dependent process, 
where history does matter (as do early conditions), and whose impact may differ depending on the 
nature of institutional arrangements. Various institutions created during colonial times have a 
bearing on the present state of institutions in Mozambique, as reflected in important continuities 
regarding the forms of political economy, amongst others.  
Originality/value: The work contributes to existing research not only through the employment of a 
new set of institutional measures, which allows for a particularly long time series investigation in 
a developing country setting, but also through its contribution to studies on modernization and 
critical junctures but in a longitudinal manner which allows for the exploration of complex 
dynamics embedded within a country’s particular political economy. The implications are far-
reaching and carry importance beyond the academy given the pressure on policymakers to get 
things right because of the persistence of institutions and their consequences and the associated 
path dependency. 
Keywords: Institutional development; modernization; Mozambique; path dependency; 
longitudinal time series 
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Institutional Drivers, Historical Determinism and Economic Development in Mozambique 
1. Introduction 
Given that 85% of the world’s population does not live in high-income countries (as defined 
by the World Bank), understanding the processes for economic development is crucial. In 
particular, increasing economic activity, international business, and investment flowing into 
developing and emerging countries, makes it important to understand how institutions impact upon 
these activities, especially given the often ‘idiosyncratic institutional features of emerging markets, 
including institutional voids, … and institutional legitimacy pressures in emerging markets’ 
(Rottig, 2016: 2).  
To be sure, institutions matter for economic growth and development - the evidence for this 
is strong (Cardenas, Garcia, & Salas, 2018; Luiz, 2006, 2009; Rodrik, 2007). But which institutions 
matter, or matter more, and the mechanisms through which these different institutions affect 
economies are more contested. Do all institutions matter equally at different stages of development 
or are some institutions more important at low income or middle income levels? These are not 
purely academic questions as they carry great importance for policymakers under pressure to get 
things right as the consequences to adopting or creating efficient institutions can be so long-lasting. 
In this regard, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012: 68-69) warn that we need to focus more on 
why poor nations get it wrong and argue that it is not a function of ignorance or culture or 
geography but rather that those who have power make choices that contribute towards 
underdevelopment and they do so purposefully. They highlight the importance of understanding 
‘how different types of policies and social arrangements affect economic incentives and behavior.’ 
From an international business perspective, for example, institutions in emerging markets 
have been shown to affect foreign direct investment (Barnard & Luiz, 2018; Buckley, Chen, Clegg, 
& Voss, 2018; Gaur, Ma, & Ding, 2018; Iammarino, 2018; Mahembe & Odhiambo, 2016; Wang 
& Li, 2018), corruption (Luiz & Stewart, 2014; Puffer, McCarthy, & Jaeger, 2016; Rabbiosi & 
Santangelo, 2018; Sartor & Beamish, 2018), the execution of business models (Urban & 
Hwindingwi, 2016), the nature and management of political risk (Giambona, Graham, & Harvey, 
2017), innovation (Newburry, McIntyre, & Xavier, 2016; Peng, Ahlstrom, Carraher, & Shi, 2017); 
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and the behavior of firms more generally within an international business context (Doh, Rodrigues, 
Saka-Helmhout, & Makhija, 2017; Luiz & Ruplal, 2013; Luiz, Stringfellow, & Jefthas, 2017; 
Meyer & Peng, 2016), amongst other impacts. It is therefore important for us to fully grasp the 
long-run, potentially deterministic, consequences of good or bad institutions, (Jackson & Deeg, 
2019; Monticelli et al., 2018) on developing and emerging markets because vast parts of the world 
are going to be experiencing significant transitions (both political and economic) in the foreseeable 
future.  
To get to the heart of this endeavor requires longitudinal case studies able to explore how 
different institutions interact with economic processes. The relative paucity of data helps explain 
the lack of these types of studies. When undertaken, these almost invariably focus on developed 
countries for which data in more abundant. Our unique dataset, which comprises a detailed long 
run time series of institutional change constructed for Mozambique from 1900 onwards, allows us 
to undertake such a study. Mozambique is a particularly interesting case because two decades ago 
it was still one of the world’s poorest countries but has since grown rapidly. Moreover, it 
experienced high levels of institutional change over the past four decades as it agitated for and then 
achieved independence in 1975, and then the brutal civil war, adopting Marxist Leninism as the 
basis for its political economy, before transitioning to a more democratic system with political and 
economic liberalization in the late 1980s.  
The case of Mozambique thus provides a rich setting to explore the webs of association 
between political and economic institutions and economic outcomes. In this paper, we examine the 
evolution of these variables, their persistence and interdependence, and the impact of institutions 
on economic progress, both before and after independence. Our research shows support for clear 
linkages between these institutions and economic development, historical determinism, as well as 
the critical juncture theory, modernization hypothesis and institutional approach. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief theoretical literature review 
while section 3 discusses the data, empirical methodology and estimation results. Section 4 
explores the webs of association between institutional drivers, historical determinism and 
economic development, and section 5 concludes.  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Why Institutions Matter 
Theories of economic growth have posited various reasons for why some countries are rich 
and others poor, but Rodrik et al. (2002) argue that the ‘quality of institutions ‘‘trumps’’ everything 
else’, and the role of institutions have been a prevailing theme in new growth theory. Institutions 
refer to the formal and informal rules of the game which govern behavior and affect our economic 
interactions (North, 1990). In economic terms, good institutions are characterized by the following: 
first, enforcement of property rights for a broad section of society, so that individuals have 
incentives to invest and partake in economic activities; second, constraints on the actions of elites, 
politicians, and other powerful groups, so that these people cannot expropriate the incomes and 
investments of others or create a highly uneven playing field; third, some degree of equal 
opportunity for broad segments of society, so that individuals can make investments, especially in 
human capital and participate in productive economic activities (Acemoglu, 2003: 27). 
By affecting incentive structures and the transaction costs of doing business in a country 
institutions frame and condition the nature of economic activity and can induce and constrain 
behavior. This is not to say that there is a homogenous set of institutions which are generically 
transferable between locations and Rodrik (2007) highlights the variety of possible institutional 
arrangements that are compatible with sound economic principles. But the principle remains that 
institutions matter and particularly so because their effects are so long-lasting and endure way 
‘beyond the lifetimes of the individuals who created them’ (Fukuyama, 2014: 543). 
2.2 Which Institutions: The Primacy of the Political or the Economic? 
Do all institutions matter equally or do some institutions figure more prominently at 
different stages of development? There are various ways in which this question can be unpacked 
but for our purposes we focus on the primacy of the political versus the economic. For example, 
should underdeveloped countries focus on political reforms first and getting the politics right before 
embarking on economic reforms; or should economic liberalization predate political change; 
should they be undertaken concurrently; do these reforms reinforce each other or could they raise 
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new sets of obstacles? We highlight three core theoretical frameworks in this regard (see Fedderke 
& Luiz, 2008). 
The first attributes primacy to the political and focuses on how political order can be 
disrupted through the struggle for self-actualization and political aspirations which elicit change 
and conflict. Huntington (1970: 319) warns that it is the process of change which triggers new 
forms of instability and trying to move between low and high equilibria may trigger social 
mobilization and demands for more change. Fukuyama (2014: 7) relates this to emerging markets 
and warns that such attempts at transition may result in ‘social change outstripping existing 
institutions’. Altered social structures materialize and new technologies unsettle how things stand 
and how institutions are able to adapt to these new pressures affect the ability of countries to 
transition out of underdevelopment. The impetus for change is thus political rather than economic. 
The second posits the primacy of the economic and is identified with the modernization 
school. Modernization theory as initially espoused by Lipset (1959) argues that good things go 
together and postulates a link from economic development to political institutions and democracy. 
Economic growth is seen as a trigger that fundamentally alters a society and gives rise to modern 
political institutions through processes of social and economic change such as the attainment of 
higher levels of education and demands for increased political participation and civil liberties.  
The third approach is the institutional approach as represented by North (1990: 104) who 
emphasizes the way in which institutions frame strategic interaction between agents: 
Long-run economic change is the cumulative consequence of innumerable short-run 
decisions by political and economic entrepreneurs that both directly and indirectly (via 
external effects) shape performance. The choices made reflect the entrepreneurs’ subjective 
modelling of the environment. … Because the models reflect ideas, ideologies, and beliefs 
… the consequences of specific policies are not only uncertain but to a substantial degree 
unpredictable. … However, the increasing-returns characteristics of the institutional matrix 
and the complementary subjective models of the players suggest that although the specific 
short-run paths are unforeseeable, the overall direction in the long run is both more 
predictable and more difficult to reverse. 
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The institutional approach as espoused by North emphasizes the importance of 
predictability and for institutions to define payoffs to political and economic activities so as to 
encourage productive activity. In particular good institutions encompass: a clearly delineated 
system of property rights; regulatory instruments to counter market failures, institutions for 
macroeconomic stabilization; and social and political institutions that mitigate risk and manage 
social conflicts (Rodrik, 2007). 
All three approaches demonstrate the interplay between political, economic, and institutional 
factors in driving economic progress and make provision for a reverse feedback loop allowing for 
endogenous structural determination. Where they differ is in the primacy they give to these factors 
and to potential directions of causation. 
2.3 Critical Junctures, Path Dependence and Historical Determinism 
The flipside of agreeing that institutions matter, is that history matters. Institutions persist 
and Fukuyama (2014: 548) warns that there is ‘no automatic historical mechanism that makes 
progress inevitable’ and that no institutional ‘system will be in equilibrium with its environment 
forever’ but that the consequences of institutions on development are profound. In an influential 
paper, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) argue that development (or non-development) is 
often the consequence of historical determinism whereby current economic performance is 
determined by current institutions and that the latter is the consequence of early institutions whose 
effects have persisted into the present. Furthermore, the early institutions are a function of 
exogenous factors - in their case related to the settlers and their mortality rates associated with 
climate and geography. The consequence of this is that the colonial state and its institutions 
persisted beyond independence and that ‘differences in the colonial experience could be a source 
of exogenous differences in institutions’ (p. 1395). In other words, institutional differences could 
be the result of a critical juncture related to European colonization that persisted and impacted and 
largely account for current economic performance and the quality of institutions. This confirmed 
earlier research by Sokoloff and Engerman (2000: 223) that concluded that there is ‘strong evidence 
that various features of the factor endowments of … New World economies - including soils, 
climates, and the size or density of the native population - predisposed them toward paths of 
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development associated with different degrees of inequality in wealth, human capital, and political 
power.’  
This implies that economic development may be path dependent and that institutions may 
themselves be endogenous to past developments and attributes. Page (2006: 88) in a survey of the 
literature on path dependence reveals four related causes: increasing returns, self-reinforcement, 
positive feedbacks, and lock-in. These effects imply that once a choice is made it sets in motion a 
set of complimentary institutions and that these are subject to externalities through increasing 
returns.  
Most studies examining the modernization hypotheses and the critical juncture theory are 
based upon cross-sectional studies (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, & Yared, 2009; Inglehart & 
Welzel, 2010; Rodrik et al., 2002), but the development of our new, unique institutional indicators 
allow us to explore these dynamics and possible webs of association between institutions and 
economic progress through a longitudinal case study of Mozambique. We can thus explore the 
interplay of critical junctures and institutional drift as well as the contingent path of history 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012) within a time series context. 
3. Data, Methodology and Results 
We measure economic progress (DEV) using Mozambique’s gross domestic product per 
capita (Figure 1), which is obtained from Maddison (2007). As for economic (ECO) and political 
(POL) institutions (Figure 2), we measure these respectively using the indices constructed for 
property and political rights in Luiz, Pereira and Oliveira (2013). The construction of these new 
institutional indices for the period 1900-2005 entailed a meticulous process through Mozambique’s 
historical records but it provides us with a richness of institutional data not previously available.  
Insert Figures 1 and 2  
In a nutshell, the construction process entailed collecting information on changes in 
Mozambique’s constitutional and legal framework over time, which was then assessed against a set 
of standardized ideal criteria to assign ratings to these changes. The aim was to capture the extent 
to which the legal framework provided for the specific rights that make up each of the indices. As 
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such, they are de jure measures which examine the impact of each piece of legislation passed 
annually that had an impact on the political and property rights, i.e.it was the rules of the game, 
rather than the outcomes, that were assessed. The ratings were also constructed so as to avoid the 
standard loss of information associated with aggregation, as well as the researcher’s subject biases. 
In this way, annual scores for political liberties and property rights were obtained, ranging 
from zero to a hundred. Increases in the scores indicate a move toward the full recognition of the 
right, and decreases indicate a move away from the ideal. Given that that this construction is well 
documented in the cited source, we provide only a cursory overview of what the indices capture. 
Property rights were constructed on the basis of seven criteria: the right to possess; the right to use; 
the right to manage; the right to capital; and the right to security; the power to transfer; and the 
liability to execution. In the case of political rights, the relevant components were: voting rights, 
freedom of association, freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, extent of arbitrary executive 
power, independence of the judiciary and the legislature, government secrecy or indemnity, the due 
process of laws, freedom of movement, academic freedom, and religious freedom. 
As for empirical methodology, we employ a two-step process along the lines of Fadiran 
and Sarr (2017). First, we use unit root and cointegration tests to assess whether history matters. 
In practice, this implies determining the existence of persistence in the data and also long-term 
equilibrium relationships between the variables. Next, we study how history matters by estimating 
multivariate models capable of detecting and incorporating long-term cointegrating relationships, 
which capture variable interdependencies. On this score, we also determine the direction of 
Granger causality between variables to gain additional insights. 
In the ensuing analysis, we consider both the 1900-74 colonial (COL) and the post-1975 
independence (IND) periods. Notwithstanding the institutional data being available from 1900, the 
colonial period considered will be shorter whenever the DEV variable is used, as the economic data 
is only available from 1950 onwards. We use EViews 9.0 to undertake our empirical analysis and 
so follow its convention when defining the break date (namely, the first date of the new regime as 
opposed to the last date of the previous regime).  
3.1 Existence of Path Dependence  
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Different kinds of temporal dynamics will describe how the past affects the present when 
‘history matters’. For example, many economic and social processes do not progress steadily 
toward some pre-determined and unique equilibrium. Instead, the nature of any equilibrium 
achieved will depend on the path pursued to get there. In other words, the outcome of a path-
dependent process may converge towards any one of several possible equilibria. To assess these 
temporal dynamics, we follow Page (2006) who provided formal definitions characterizing the 
different types of historical dependence.1  
The empirical implications of dependence, meanwhile, are addressed in Jackson and 
Kollman (2010).2 The issue of how path dependence, as defined by Page (2006), may be tested 
empirically is further addressed in Freeman (2012), as well as Jackson and Kollman (2012). For 
present purposes, we highlight the analysis by Freeman and Jackson (2012: 8, 10-11, 23), which is 
based on an AR(1) autoregressive process: 
 
In this context, an outcome dependent process is taken to mean that the current outcome yt is 
determined by past outcomes yt-s where s = 1...p. Bearing this in mind, this study established that 
a unit root test may be used to detect persistence, and hence both outcome and phat dependence, 
as the AR(1) process is persistent or non-stationary when | ρ | ≥ 1. 3   
We rely on two different unit root tests to assess the existence of path dependence, namely 
the Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock Dickey-Fuller with Generalized Least Squares (GDF) de-trending 
and the Ng-Perron (NP).4 The second test was developed by Ng and Perron (2001) and builds upon 
earlier related work by Perron and Ng (1996) as well as Elliott et al. (1996).5 The GDP and NP unit 
root test results are summarized in Table 1 (while detailed results are available upon request, 
including those below that include a structural break).6 
Insert Table 1 
Both unit roots tests indicate that all three variables are integrated of order one I(1) across 
all periods, i.e. non-stationary in levels but stationary after first-differencing. In other words, all 
1     1,2,3...t t ty y e tρ −= + =
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three variables exhibit considerable persistence and may be characterized by phat dependence: 
although history matters it does not matter as a sequence but as a set of previous events (Freeman, 
2012).7 Moreover, the sequence of initial events has an effect on current events within the 
institutional environment (Page, 2006). 
For the sake of robustness, we also look at the issue of structural breaks in a trend, which 
most traditional unit root tests do not accommodate. This problem is particularly relevant for 
institutional data, which tends to show no variation over long periods of time but may be subject 
to sharp jumps in response to the promulgation or repeal of laws affecting institutions at times. 
Indeed, structural changes and unit roots are closely related. More importantly, standard unit root 
tests will be biased toward a false unit root null when the data are trend stationary with a structural 
break, as discussed in Perron (1989). We thus conduct a unit root test with a (single) known break 
point, which covers the full sample and evaluates the null hypothesis that the data follow a unit 
root process, possibly with a break, against a trend stationary with break alternative.8 None of the 
test results allows us to reject the null hypothesis.   
3.2 Existence of Equilibrium Dependence  
As discussed in Freeman and Jackson (2012: 10-11), multivariate error correction models 
allow for the testing of equilibrium dependence. Economic theory often suggests that certain 
combinations of economic, financial or institutional variables should be linked by a long-run 
relationship. Multivariate error correction models allow for the identification of such relationships 
by restricting the behavior of the endogenous variables to converge to their long-run equilibrium, 
while simultaneously allowing the deviation from this equilibrium to be gradually corrected 
through a series of partial short-run adjustments.9  
To test for cointegration, we use the Vector Error Correction (VEC) model which was 
developed by Johansen (1991, 1995).10 This model is preferred over the Engel-Granger two-step 
approach (Engle & Granger, 1987), and also the single-equation Error Correction model (Ericsson 
& MacKinnon, 2002), as it does not impose undue exogenous restrictions on model variables, 
which are taken to be endogenous from the onset. In effect, the VEC model is a restricted Vector 
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Autoregressive (VAR) designed for use with non-stationary series that are known to be 
cointegrated. Consider the following VAR model of order (p):  
    (1) 
where and Π = is an n × n matrix. If the coefficient matrix Π has a reduced 
rank r such that 0 ≤ r ≤ n, then there exist two n × r matrices α and β with rank (α) = rank(β) = r 
such that the vector 1'Ztβ −  is stationary and 'αβΠ = . Moreover, there will be r cointegrating 
relationships such that this stationary vector characterizes the long-run equilibrium. The matrix 
i
Γ  
will then reflect the short-run adjustment while matrix α is interpretable as the speed of 
adjustment towards long-run equilibrium. To determine the number of cointegrating vectors, we use 
the maximum eigenvalue and trace statistics developed by Johansen (1988).11 
We estimate the VEC model given by equation (1) in two steps. In the first, we estimate the 
cointegrating relations from the Johansen procedure, as used in the cointegration tests. In the 
second step, we construct the error correction terms from the estimated cointegrating relations and 
proceed to estimate a first-difference VAR that includes them as regressors. When estimating 
equation (1), we further restrict the deterministic terms of the cointegrating vectors to be constants, 
and do not include any exogenous variables other than dummies when appropriate. In the absence 
of cointegrating relations, we simply estimate VAR models for those cases.    
Insert Table 2 
The Johansen trace and maximum cointegration tests are summarized in Table 2.12 Note 
that there is no evidence of any cointegration relations for the colonial period. Indeed, institutions 
and development do not trend towards a long-run equilibrium relationship, which would entail the 
existence of a long-run limiting distribution over current outcomes that depends on past ones. 
Moreover, no form of long-run co-movement can be established between political and economic 
institutions. The same holds true for the pairwise comparisons comprising either of the two 
institutions and economic development.  
1
1  
1
  
p
t t i t i t
i
Y a Y Y ε
−
− −
=
∆ = + Π + Γ ∆ +∑
1
p
i j
j i
A
= +
Γ = −∑
1
p
i
iA I
=
−∑
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For the independence period, however, we find evidence of a three-variable cointegrating 
relationship between DEV, ECO and POL. In other words, there is evidence of an equilibrium-
dependent process, where history does matter as too do early conditions but in a more predicable 
manner over time. This finding implies that the post-independence regime may be characterized 
by the existence of an equilibrium correction representation of the three variables, where 
disequilibria in the past are gradually corrected to establish the equilibrium in the present.  
We also find evidence of two cointegrating relationships involving pairwise variables, 
namely DEV and ECO and ECO and POL. Moreover, the estimated speed of adjustment of the 
cointegrating relations in the respective VEC error correction term, when significant, have the 
expected sign (negative) and magnitude (lie between zero and one), which implies the system is 
stable. The only exception is the absence of any such relationship between DEV and POL.  
3.3 Nature of Historical Interdependence 
Assessing the nature of interdependence entails looking at the direction of causality between 
the variables in question, if any. To this end, we rely on the concept of causality due to Granger 
(1969). Without the loss of generality, consider the following system that allows for linear 
interdependencies between the variables and :   
     (2) 
     (3) 
where  and are serially uncorrelated random disturbances with zero-means. The variable
is said to Granger-cause  if past values of contain information that helps to predict  above 
and beyond the information contained in past values of  alone. An analogous reasoning applies to 
the case where  Granger-causes .  
tX tY
1 1 2
1 1
  
p q
t r t r s t s t
r s
X Y Xα β β µ− −
= =
= + + +∑ ∑
1 1 2
1 1
  
n m
t i t i j t j t
i j
Y X Yα θ θ ε− −
= =
= + + +∑ ∑
tµ tε tX
tY tX tY
tY
tY tX
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Under this specification, two causality tests may be undertaken: First, the null hypothesis 
 is tested against the alternative  or  for 
some  Rejecting the null implies that Granger-causes ; Second, the null 
 is tested against the alternative  or  for 
some  Rejecting this null similarly implies that  Granger-causes . 
In practice, we estimate the system comprising equations (2) and (3) using unrestricted 
VAR models. This allows us undertake pairwise Granger causality tests to determine whether an 
endogenous variable can be treated as exogenous. The extension to the three variable case is 
straightforward, and the causality testing procedure analogous. In the presence of cointegration, we 
estimate VEC models instead and also look at their long-term equilibrium relations in order to 
obtain additional insights regarding the nature of variable interdependence. The Granger causality 
test results are summarized in Table 3.13 
Insert Table 3 
For the colonial period, we find using Test 1 that DEV and POL jointly (Granger) cause 
ECO but only the POL variable is individually significant (22.427***).14 However, DEV does not 
cause ECO (Test 3) and POL does not cause ECO (Test 4), which suggests that it is the interaction 
between economic progress and political rights that drives economic rights during this period. We 
also find that ECO causes DEV, as is to be expected, but that the reverse is not true (Test 2).  
As for the independence period, we find that ECO and DEV not only jointly cause POL but 
also individually (7.369** and 7.409** respectively). However, neither ECO nor DEV cause POL 
(Test 2 and 3 respectively). This suggests that it is the interaction between economic progress and 
economic rights that drives political rights. We also find that DEV causes ECO but not the other 
way round (Test 2), which is contrary to what was found for the colonial period. Significantly, the 
causality between ECO and POL is bi-directional (Test 4). 
4. Linking Institutions, History and Economic Development 
0 11 12 1: ..... 0nH θ θ θ= = = = 1 1 : 0iH θ ≠ i∀ 1 1 : 0iH θ ≠
1,..., .i n= tX tY
0 11 12 1: ..... 0pH β β β= = = = 1 1 : 0rH β ≠ r∀ 1 1 : 0rH β ≠
1,...., .r p= tY tX
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We now explore the webs of association between institutional drivers, historical 
determinism and economic development in Mozambique. To be sure, important questions need to 
be answered: Which institutions matter more for economic progress? What evidence is there for 
critical junctures, political primacy and modernization theory? In answering these questions, we 
highlight the patterns of Mozambique’s property and political rights as discussed in detail in Luiz, 
Pereira and Oliveira (2013).15  
We have looked, thus far, at whether and how history matters, by assessing path/equilibrium 
dependence, cointegration relationships and Granger causality. Our findings established that 
institutions and economic progress exhibit phat dependence in both periods (Table 1), which 
implies that history does matter (as a set of previous events rather than as a sequence of them). The 
analysis does not allow us to determine, however, the exact causes of phat dependence, as 
enumerated by Page (2006: 88). Moreover, the two periods of analysis differ when it comes to the 
existence of equilibrium dependence (a long-run limiting distribution over current outcomes that 
depends on past ones). During the colonial period, there is no evidence of cointegration for any of 
the four possible combinations of variables (Table 2). In contrast, institutions and economic 
progress trend together towards a long-run equilibrium relationship after independence. 
We take this to be a sign of historical determinism where current outcomes are determined 
by current institutions which, in turn, reflect the persistent effects of early institutions. The 
sequence of initial events may also have had an effect on current events but it is likely that this 
effect is more defining and limiting (in the long-run equilibrium sense) after independence. In other 
words, history always matters but its impact is more pronounced, and perhaps more deterministic, 
after independence. In sum, our findings imply that economic progress and institutions are 
endogenous to past attributes and developments. More importantly, they give rise to other, yet to 
be answered, questions, namely: which set of critical events is shaping each period’s institutional 
and economic environment and, why is the effect of history not uniform across the two periods?  
Before addressing them, and by way of context, note that the two institutional indices often 
reflect the political instability and policy changes in Portugal during the colonial period. For 
example, the rise of the Estado Novo regime that reasserted Portuguese sovereignty, tightened 
control over state activities, greater centralization and thus the reduction of rights in the colonies. 
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The Colonial Act maintained legal distinctions between natives and non-natives and saw greater 
restrictions as regards the latter in terms of both rights. In the 1950’s and early 1960’s, meanwhile, 
there was a wave of significant political and economic changes. Industrial policy was liberalized, 
trade was diversified and the first Economic Development Plan was implemented, which led to 
GDP per capita growing 20.4 % (1990 Int$ 1133 to 1364) during 1950-66 (Figure 1).  
Economic rights were also strengthened during the periods 1952-55 and 1959-61. Political 
reforms, meanwhile, sought to increase the representation of colonial interests back in the 
homeland. During 1959-62, the increase in political rights was modest, even as the distinction 
between natives and non-natives was abolished (Figure 2). Indeed, Portugal sought to reinforce the 
colonial status quo during this period, while many African countries were gaining their 
independence.  
Turning now to the set of critical events, we first identify those years in and around which 
these may have occurred. Specifically, we focus on those years where our models’ goodness of fit, 
and hence explanatory power, is less pronounced. This entails identifying the residuals that lie 
outside the one standard-deviation interval for each model-equation (Table 4).16 Next, we link these 
residuals to specific events occurring in the neighborhood of the years/periods thus identified with 
recourse to the historical detail provided in Luiz et al. (2013). In doing so, we also rely on the 
Granger causality test results (Table 3) to infer which type of events we should focus on, i.e. which 
of the three model variables (alone or combined) is/are likely to be associated with the outliers (the 
years shown in bold in Table 4).  
Insert Table 4 
For the colonial period, we focus on DEV and POL events around 1966 and 1973-74 based 
on the residual analysis.17 We find that the start of Mozambique’s liberation war in 1964, and the 
marked increase in political and security strife that ensued, critically characterizes the 1966 
neighborhood but for different reasons. Although there are no significant changes to political rights 
immediately prior to 1966, their very modest increase during 1959-62 clearly comes to an end. As 
for economic rights, these increase markedly to achieve their highest level during 1967 (Figure 2).  
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GDP per capita, meanwhile, increased by 35.1% (1990 Int$ 1364 to 1843) during the period 
1966-73 (Figure 1). While the growth trend is positive throughout the colonial period, it accelerates 
markedly when the Portuguese authorities sought to create more favorable conditions for social 
and economic development (via the second and subsequent Economic Development Plans), as part 
of their response to FRELIMO’s insurgency actions. Taken together, these two findings imply that 
the Portuguese authorities sought to foster economic progress by bolstering the economic rights 
without increasing political rights, however. Hence, our finding that it is the interaction between 
economic progress and (and a given level of) political rights that is driving economic rights. This 
insight also helps to explain why ECO causes DEV (model 2) while POL does not cause DEV 
(model 3). 
The period 1973-74, meanwhile, captures the end of the dictatorial regime in Portugal, 
where declining support for the colonial war, and increasing economic malaise due to the 1973 
global oil shock, fueled the military-led Carnation revolution in 1974. To the sure, Mozambique’s 
relatively chaotic transition to an independent country created a set of initial conditions à la Page 
(2006) whose effects would prove to be problematic and long-lasting, both institutionally and 
economically. As the old order collapsed, newly-independent Mozambique faced the daunting task 
of governance equipped with a greatly diminished public administration, as many civil servants 
left the country taking their know-how with them. As a result, GDP per capita declined 23.8% 
(1990 Int$ 1843 to 1404) during 1973-75. 
The transition period’s challenging state of affairs was clearly compounded by post-
independence institutional and development policy changes that would prove to be problematic, as 
discussed in Meyns (1981). The post-independence ruling party in Mozambique, FRELIMO 
created a single-party authoritarian regime that suppressed basic freedoms and rights (like habeas 
corpus) and repressed pluralism - political, religious and educational. Institutions clearly diminished 
the rule of law even without counting typical de facto manifestations of the political and social 
processes. The effect of these negative changes, like the creation of the Revolutionary Military 
Tribunals (1979) - classified by most authors as oppressive and arbitrary institutions - more than 
offset that of positive measures, like the recognition of the right of people to vote in assemblies 
(1977). FRELIMO also sought to create a centrally-planned economy, given its ideology of Marxist 
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Leninism. This resulted in large companies and cooperatives tasked with managing land usage, and 
private property practically disappeared through large-scale nationalization. Both political and 
economic rights declined precipitously as a result (Figure 2). During this period, Mozambique’s 
civil war broke out in 1977, as the anti-communist RENAMO movement also began to use force 
to oppose the governing regime.  
As for the independence period, the residual analysis suggests we look mainly at DEV and 
ECO events in the neighborhood of 1978, 1986 and 1992-93 (Table 4). In 1978, the National 
Economic Plan was drawn up, which focused on education, healthcare and production. This year 
should be seen, however, as a culmination point of significant changes that had a negative impact 
on economic activity in the preceding three years, notably the turmoil of the transition period, the 
departure of skilled white settlers, the expulsion of merchants (mainly of Indian origin) and the 
successive waves of nationalizations. Not surprisingly, GDP per capita declined a further 34.5% 
(1990 Int$ 1404 to 920) during 1975-85. 
The period around 1986 similarly reflects a culmination point but of the first set of 
economic reforms (1983-86) aimed at promoting private-sector business initiatives and attracting 
foreign investment. In 1983, the need for major political and economic reforms had been 
recognized by President Samora Machel, when he conceded that socialism had failed during 
FRELIMO’s third party congress. Upon his death, it was left to his successor, Joaquim Chissano, 
to implement the political reforms that followed the move towards a market-determined 
development model. These reforms included a more democratic framework, which allowed for the 
first parliamentary elections since 1977.  
The period 1992-93, meanwhile, reflects the end of Mozambique's civil war with the 
signing of the Rome Accord. Mozambique's first multi-party presidential and legislative elections 
took place in 1994, which were won by FRELIMO. Important economic reforms were also 
pursued. In 1993, a wave of legislation tore down most restrictions on foreign investment, 
demanding only that all domestic and foreign investment decisions must have government’s 
approval. This was followed by ambitious land policy reforms (1995-99) that sought to protect 
existing land rights, resolve land disputes and attract investment into rural areas. The peace 
dividend and policy reforms undoubtedly allowed for greater economic progress with GDP per 
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capita increasing 77.9% (1990 Int$ 1032 to 1836) during 1992-2005. The expansion of both rights 
during this period is also notable.  
For the post-independence period, recall that it is the interaction between economic rights 
and economic progress that is driving political rights.18 When compared to the colonial period, the 
interpretation of this finding is less straightforward, however, as both rights change much over 
time. In order to obtain additional insights, we compare the correlations of the three variables 
before and after having being used in the VAR/VEC models (Table 5). The intuition is that a well-
fitting model will incorporate the impact of the variables driving observed behavior, which implies 
that their residual correlations should be close to zero. The opposite is true for those variables 
lacking explanatory power. Note also that assessing the linkages between political and economic 
rights only makes sense within a given context of economic development, as evidenced by the low 
correlations when this context not taken into account. 
Insert Table 5   
 For the colonial period, we find that political rights become highly correlated with 
economic progress (0.189 to 0.651) once the VAR model incorporates the effect of economic 
rights, which become less correlated and slightly negative (0.86 to -0.071). This finding implies a 
large scope to improve political rights that are conducive with economic progress, while additional 
increases in economic rights would have actually been counterproductive. It also points to the 
primacy of economic rights in driving development, which supports the modernization hypothesis 
during the colonial period. After independence, however, there is no evidence of a similar effect 
once the VAR model incorporates the fact that institutions and economic progress trend together 
towards a long-run equilibrium cointegration relationship (Table 2). Instead, political and 
economic rights become much less correlated with one another (0.946 to 0.120). We take this to 
be a sign of the consolidation and predictability of institutions, which is compatible with the 
institutional approach.  
Insert Figure 3 
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To assess the relative importance of economic and political rights, we consider the 
cointegration relationship between them (Figure 3), which reaches equilibrium in 1986 when the 
reformer Chissano ascended to power.19 Before this year, economic rights dominate political ones 
while the opposite is true afterwards. The changing nature of the institutional regime is also clearly 
visible around this time, which again reflects a reforming political economy, and its consolidation 
following the constitutional changes (1990) and the Rome Accord (1992) that formally ended 
Mozambique’s civil war. We take this to be evidence in favor of the primacy of the economic over 
the political (in the run-up to 1986), as well as the modernization hypothesis. It also explains why 
economic rights and economic progress trend together towards a long-run equilibrium relationship 
while political rights and economic progress do not (Table 2). Moreover, we regard the bi-
directional causality between economic and political rights (Table 3) as a further sign of 
institutional consolidation and stability. This finding explains why the effect of history is not 
uniform across periods, which was the other answered question we needed to address.  
Notwithstanding this last finding, it is important to stress that there was a high degree of 
continuity between the colonial and socialist regimes, as discussed in Sabaratnam (2011, 2013). 
While recognizing that important changes had occurred (such as less widespread physical violence, 
compulsory free labor and the shift away from economic autarchy), Sabaratnam (2011:193) 
nevertheless argues that these are not by and large as central to forms of rule, which pertain to the 
issues concerning the claiming, distribution and structuring of political power, wealth and control. 
To be sure, there were important continuities in forms of political authority, political economy and 
public administration, as well as recurrent forms of crisis, rebellion and resistance against that rule 
(Sabaratnam, 2011:157).20 As a result, some of the strong elements of continuity include the 
regimes’ modernizing visions, labor-intensive political economies and hierarchical, authoritarian 
practices and structures of rule (Sabaratnam, 2011:182). 
In summary, institutions mattered for Mozambique’s economic development during the 
period 1950-2005. We find evidence of the primacy of economic over the political institutions, and 
also of modernization theory à la Lipset (1959), both before and after independence. We also find 
evidence of critical junctions. For post-1950 colonial period, two critical events stand out - the start 
of the liberation war (1964) and the revolution in Portugal (1974). In response to the first, 
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Portuguese authorities sought to create more favorable conditions for economic growth, apparently 
in an effort to reaffirm ‘sovereignty’ as well as to eventually win over the hearts and minds of the 
colonized. Increasing economic rights were seen as instrumental in bringing about the desired 
economic development, while repressive force and propaganda respectively addressed the 
deteriorating security and political climate.  
However, we believe that this decoupling of economic and political rights implies poor 
institutional ownership, especially as the colonial dispensation generally reflects a relationship of 
dependency on the colonial power. It seems that Portugal had little incentive to get all of 
Mozambique’s institutions right. This may have been due to the illusion of control whereby the 
colonizing country wields political power but lacks political legitimacy for its use, which ultimately 
requires the assent of the colonized to ensure the sustainability of outcomes. As a result, neither 
the political situation nor the economic progress that characterized the 1960s would endure.  
The demise of the colonial period was followed by a short but problematic transition to 
independence (1974-75), whose negative impact was compounded by strongly ideological 
governance and the start of the civil war (1977). Indeed, the three years following independence 
were characterized by political repression and economic radicalism, which would also prove to be 
unsustainable. The reversal of this state of affairs began with the first wave of economic reforms 
(1983-86), which were followed by others that moved Mozambique towards democracy and 
market-determined development under Chissano’s leadership (1986-2004), and also created 
conditions for the civil war to be brought to an end (1992).  
The take-home message is that enduring peace and prosperity requires that economic 
progress goes hand in hand with development of political and economic rights. Bearing in mind 
North (1990: 104), we can expect to find consolidated and predictable institutions defining payoffs 
to political and economic activities so as to encourage productive activity, and which are wholly 
owned by relevant stakeholders. Moreover, the sequencing of economic and political reforms is 
likely to be context-specific. In the case of Mozambique, this entailed fixing important problems – 
getting the economy right, granting more freedom and making peace – all which required effective 
economic and political reforms, underpinned by a solid institutional ownership to ensure enduring 
changes. 
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Finally, note that our findings are specific to Mozambique although our analytical 
framework and empirical methodology is, of course, generalizable to other cases. To be sure, the 
impact of history may differ depending on the colony in question, even when the colonial power is 
the same. For example, Chabal (2001:232) argues that the unity of nationalist purpose in 
Mozambique was achieved against considerably larger odds than in Angola when undertaking a 
comparative historical analysis of the two cases. As result, the two parties which took control at 
independence, though superficially similar in ideology, were in fact endowed with distinct political 
attributes, of which nation-building legitimacy was cardinal. The weight of history in these 
countries was thus different.  
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we explore the webs of association between institutional drivers, historical 
determinism and economic development in Mozambique. Indeed, recognizing institutional path 
dependency, and how it particularly affects post-colonial countries, means that we cannot discount 
the past. In the spirit of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), our work contributes to existing research 
in a developing country setting by employing a new longitudinal set of institutional measures, as 
well as to studies on critical junctures and modernization theory. As such, we provide new insights 
into the interplay of critical junctures, institutional drift and history’s contingent path within a 
specific political-economy and time series context, which is a novel endeavor to the best of our 
knowledge. 
Our conceptual framework allows for the interaction between political, economic, and 
institutional factors in driving economic progress while recognizing that development is often the 
consequence of historical determinism. In practice, our empirical analysis addresses the two 
interrelated issues of whether history matters and, if so, how history matters for Mozambique, 
before and after its independence in 1975. In this regard, we use the construction of a new set of 
institutional indicators to examine the evolution of political and economic institutions, their 
persistence and interdependence and their effects on economic outcomes. We also identify the 
critical events behind the impact of history, as well as which institutions matter more for economic 
growth.  
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Our findings establish that history always matters but its impact is not uniform, which we 
attribute to differences in the consolidation, predictability and ownership of institutional 
arrangements across the two sample periods. We also find evidence of the primacy of economic 
rights in driving development, and hence of the modernization hypothesis for both periods, which 
likely reflects important continuities in forms of Mozambique’s political authority, political 
economy and public administration. As for critical junctures, their existence is verified while their 
impact differs depending on their origin and nature. In sum, our findings imply that economic 
progress and institutions are endogenous to past attributes and developments, which are always 
context-specific even when considering countries colonized by the same colonial power. 
We see our study as opening new avenues for research by not taking institutions for granted 
and by exploring their evolution and possible historical determinism. To be sure, the implications of 
our work are far-reaching. For a start, and as we stated at the outset, these are not purely academic 
questions as they carry great importance for policymakers under pressure to get things right because of 
the persistence of institutions and their consequences and the associated path dependency. As Page 
(2006: 88) reminds us: ‘The stakes here may be large. Path dependence may help explain why some 
countries succeed and others do not.’ 
Our research has policy importance from a development perspective, for example, as it 
highlights the fact that countries do not start their path to development with a clean institutional slate. 
This implies that a ‘one size fits all’ approach to development policy is unlikely to be appropriate. 
Recognizing this reality is all the more important in the face of globalization, which is characterized by 
an uneven playfield that will have a profound effect on how future transnational agreements are 
regulated. Rodrik (2018: 27) argues that there is the need for a ‘reality check’ to rebalance globalization 
to ensure its benefits are spread more evenly and to address the ‘corrosive asymmetry’ of existing 
institutional agreements 
Our research adds urgency to this call by recognizing the burden of history, both at an 
international and national level. While national policymakers need to take history into account, they 
also need to be aware that history is not fate. Indeed, it is possible to ensure positive combinations of 
institutions and policies that are conducive to successful development outcomes, given history and 
globalization. For example, Macedo and Pereira (2016) find evidence of macro-level public policy and 
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macro-institutional combinations underpinning successful trade diversification (an indicator of 
globalization) and income convergence (an indicator of governance) in regions of sub-Saharan Africa 
(including Mozambique). 
Although our paper does not examine the impact on business directly, the implications for 
business loom large. Because institutional effects persist, the consequences for how it affects the 
environment of business and the transaction costs are the most obvious but our work also demonstrates 
the webs of association between different institutional indicators and economic processes and this is 
related to the interplay between business, government, and society more generally. 
The research has limitations. It is not intended to be a growth study for Mozambique and the 
limitations in terms of data do not allow for a fuller exploration of the determinants of growth over this 
time period. This task, which constitutes part of the future research agenda, entails taking into account 
other variables that co-determine growth such as, domestic and foreign investment, international aid, 
trade, amongst others, and also spatial development aspects along the lines of Chiovelli et al. (2018). 
Furthermore, there are limitations in terms of the construction of the institutional series themselves in 
that they are de jure measures which may not fully capture how laws are implemented or enforced. 
Nonetheless it provides a richness of institutional data not previously available with this level of 
granularity until now, and which is assessed and interpreted within a complementary theoretical, 
empirical and historical framework. 
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Table 1: Summary of Unit Root Tests 
Variables Colonial Period (1900-1974) Independence (1975-2005) 
DEV GDF t-test NP-Mza GDF t-test NP-Mza 
Level -3.151* -10.642 -0.865 -10.168 
1st Difference -5.710*** -8.617** -3.004*** -9.439** 
POL   
Level -2.217 -11.758 -1.183378 0.0409 
1st Difference -2.417** -15.436*** -6.857*** -14.534*** 
ECO   
Level -1.089 -2.864 -1.459 -3.260 
1st Difference -3.073*** -14.887*** -5.213*** -14.481*** 
Reported results are the Generalized Dickey Fuller (GDF) t-statistic and the Ng-Perron 
(NP) modified Phillips-Perron Z(α) statistic. The significance levels of 10%, (5%) and (1%) 
are denoted by * (**) (***) respectively. The colonial period considered is shorter 
whenever the DEV variable is used, as the economic data is only available from 1950 
onwards. 
 
Table 2: Summary of Cointegration Tests 
Variables 
Colonial Period (1900-1974) Independence (1975-2005) 
Trace 
Maximum 
Eigenvalue 
Cointegration 
and Rank 
Trace 
Maximum 
Eigenvalue 
Cointegration 
and Rank 
DEV, ECO, POL 23.390 13.041 No 48.047** 35.318** Yes (1) 
DEV, ECO 13.501 8.419 No 28.564** 25.680** Yes (1) 
DEV, POL 12.510 10.622 No 7.897 6.213 No 
ECO, POL 5.753 5.574 No 26.634** 25.732** Yes (1) 
The trace statistic reports the result of the null hypothesis of r=0 cointegrating relations against the alternative of k relations, 
where r < k. The maximum eigenvalue statistic, meanwhile, reports the outcome of the null hypothesis of r=0 cointegrating 
relations against the alternative of r+1. A double asterisk (**) denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% 
significance level using the respective test’s critical value. The colonial period considered is shorter whenever the DEV 
variable is used, as the economic data is only available from 1950 onwards. 
 
  
33 
 
Table 3: Summary of Granger Causality Tests 
Tests  
Colonial Period (1900-1974) Independence (1975-2005) 
Model / DF Chi-Square Causality Model / DF Chi-Square Causality 
1) DEV, ECO, POL   
ECO and POL → DEV VAR / 2 1.949 No VEC / 2 1.504 No 
DEV and POL → ECO VAR / 2 26.450*** Yes VEC / 2 1.368 No 
ECO andDEV → POL VAR / 2 1.002 No VEC / 2 13.211** Yes 
2) DEV, ECO   
ECO → DEV VAR / 1 5.607** Yes VEC / 1 0.640 No 
DEV → ECO VAR / 1 0.001 No VEC / 1 4.568** Yes 
3) DEV, POL   
POL → DEV VAR / 1 0.180 No VAR / 1 9.792*** Yes 
DEV → POL VAR / 1 0.296 No VAR / 1 1.485 No 
4) ECO, POL   
POL → ECO VAR / 1 1.127 No VEC / 1 5.991** Yes 
ECO → POL VAR / 1 0.086 No VEC / 1 6.349** Yes 
The Chi-square (Wald) statistic reports the significance of the lagged endogenous variable in the estimated equation for each 
test, and DF denotes the degrees of freedom. When two endogenous variables are used, their joint significance is reported. In the 
case of VEC models, only first-differenced lagged variables are tested for exclusion, i.e. those in the cointegrating equations are 
not tested. The significance levels of 10%, (5%) and (1%) are denoted by * (**) (***) respectively. The colonial period considered 
is shorter whenever the DEV variable is used, as the economic data is only available from 1950 onwards. 
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Table 4: Residual Outliers (by year) 
Models 
Colonial Period (1900-1974) Independence (1975-2005) 
DEV ECO POL DEV ECO POL 
1) DEV, ECO, POL                              
1966            
1973-74 
1954                  
1960 / 62     
                
1966        
1973-74 
1978                   
1985-86 / 88 
1992-93      
2000-01 
1978                   
1986                      
1991 / 1992-93       
                
1982-83 / 86 
1990          
(Joint) Granger Causality:                                        
DEV and POL → ECO                                   
POL alone is individually significant 
(Joint) Granger Causality:                                                             
ECO and DEV → POL                                      
ECO and POL are both individually significant 
2) DEV, ECO                    
1963 / 66      
1973-74 
1953 / 1958-59 
1961 / 67 
-- 
1975             
1986-87       
1992            
2001 
1975           
1984 / 1986-87   
1992-93 / 95      
2001 
-- 
Granger Causality:                                        
ECO → DEV 
Granger Causality:                                            
DEV → ECO 
3) DEV, POL                    
1963 / 66             
1973-74 
-- 
1953            
1960       
1973-74 
1975                                                                                                                                    
0000             
1992             
2000 
 
000
1982-83 / 86        
1990 
Granger Causality:                                        
None 
Granger Causality:                                            
POL → DEV 
4) ECO, POL 
-- 
1918               
1929          
1932 / 38   
1941 / 1944-45            
1953             
1961 / 1966-67  
1911 / 19 
1926         
000 / 00   
0000 / 00                                                       
1956               
1960               
1974 
-- 
                    
1984 / 89   
1993-94 / 1997 
1978-79         
1985          
1990          
Granger Causality:                                        
None 
Granger Causality:                                             
POL → ECO and also ECO → POL 
Outliers are those residuals that lie outside the interval of one standard-deviation for each model-equation. Each model’s standard 
deviation is measured using the respective standard error estimate. Note that the colonial period effectively considered in 
estimations is shorter whenever the DEV variable is used, as this economic data is only available from 1950 onwards. 
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Table 5: Variable and Model Residual Correlations 
The standard error (SE) of a statistic (usually an estimate of a parameter) is the standard deviation of its sampling distribution 
or an estimate of that standard deviation. Note that the colonial period effectively considered in estimations is shorter 
whenever the DEV variable is used, as this economic data is only available from 1950 onwards. 
 
  
 Colonial Period (1900-1974) Independence (1975-2005) 
 DEV ECO POL DEV ECO POL 
Variables   
DEV 1.000   1.000   
ECO 0.860 1.000  0.436 1.000  
POL 0.189 0.371 1.000 0.303 0.946 1.000 
1) DEV, ECO, POL   
DEV 1.000   1.000   
ECO -0.071 1.000  0.310 1.000  
POL 0.651 0.426 1.000 0.258 0.120 1.000 
2) DEV, ECO   
DEV 1.000  --- 1.000  --- 
ECO 0.182 1.000 --- 0.314 1.000 --- 
3) DEV, POL   
DEV 1.000 ---  1.000 ---  
POL 0.677 --- 1.000 0.345 --- 1.000 
4) ECO, POL       
ECO --- 1.000  --- 1.000  
POL --- 0.081 1.000 --- -0.063 1.000 
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Figure 1: GDP per capita for Mozambique 1950-2005 
 
Source: Based on Maddison (2007) 
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Figure 2: Property and Political Rights for Mozambique 1900-2005 
Source: Luiz, Pereira and Oliveira (2013) 
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Figure 3: Economic and Political Rights Cointegration Relation for Mozambique 1975-2005 
(Normalized Scale) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own Analysis 
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Endnotes 
1 This study distinguished between path-, or equilibrium-, dependent processes (where early conditions continue to 
matter), outcome-dependent processes (where only recent history matters), and also outcome-independent processes 
(where history does not matter at all). Equivalently, outcome dependence entails current outcomes depending either 
on past outcomes or the time period, and equilibrium dependence requires that the long-run limiting distribution over 
current outcomes depends on past outcomes. The study also distinguished between path dependence (where the path 
of previous outcomes matters), phat dependence (where the events in the path matter but not their order), and state 
dependence (where the paths can be partitioned into a finite number of states containing all relevant information). 
 
2 For common dynamic models, the study showed that a necessary condition for path dependence is the existence of a 
time-varying autoregressive parameter that becomes one at some point. Failure to meet this critical condition results 
in a path independent process, whose outcome is only a function of current exogenous conditions. 
 
3 Unit root tests are used to detect non-stationarity as standard inference procedures will not apply. The standard test 
is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) developed by Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981). Phillips and Perron (1988) 
developed one that is robust to unspecified autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the model’s error term.  
 
4 The first test was developed by Elliott, Rothenberg and Stockm (1996) to detect a unit root in time series featuring 
deterministic components (such as a constant or a linear trend). The GDF testing procedure entails first de-trending 
the time series to efficiently estimate its deterministic parameters, and then using the transformed data to perform the 
usual ADF test. More importantly, the former test dominates the latter test in terms of power, i.e. the probability of 
rejecting a false null hypothesis of a unit root. 
 
5 Compared to the ADF and PP tests, the NP test has greater power than either one when the time series is characterized 
by a large autoregressive root. The NP test has thus come to be the preferred alternative to standard ADF and PP tests. 
For more details, see DeJong, Nankervis, Savin and Whiteman (1992).  
 
6 To determine the use of intercept and trends terms, we visually inspect the time series and also compare the goodness 
of fit using alternative specifications. Barring the IND period, we use both an intercept and trend term when testing 
the level of variables, and an intercept otherwise. In the IND period, a trend and intercept is used only when testing 
the level of DEV. In this same period, we also find that the inclusion of the year 1975 negatively affects the reliability 
of our estimation when testing the first difference of DEV and POL. This is possibly due to the disruptive nature of 
economic and political events occurring in that year. As such, we exclude this data point when testing for unit roots in 
these two instances. For the COL and IND periods, we tend to favor the results of NP over GDP since the latter is more 
prone to serial autocorrelation problems, as measured by the Durbin-Watson statistic. 
 
7 For the institutional variables, the persistence detected may reflect their process of construction, where ‘Ratings for 
a given year are done relative to the previous year’s score’ (Luiz, Pereira & Oliveira, 2013:680). Although caution is 
warranted in this case, our finding that history matters for institutions is clearly substantiated by the remaining 
empirical results, as well as the historical context.     
 
8 We assume trending data that is subject to a change in level. We further assume that the breakpoint is known (the 
year of independence 1975) and that it occurs immediately (additive outlier) rather than gradually (innovational 
outlier). The number of lag terms in the Dickey-Fuller equations is chosen to be large enough to eliminate the effect 
of the correlation structure of the errors on the asymptotic distribution of the test statistic. 
 
9 Error correction models are appropriate when (non-stationary) when cointegration exists, i.e. the series share a 
common long-run stochastic trend but exhibit no other relationships otherwise. Cointegrated variables obey an 
equilibrium relationship in the long-run, although they may diverge substantially from it in the short run. The resulting 
cointegration relation equation will capture the long-run relationship between the variables characterized by the 
respective cointegrating vector-weights, as discussed in Engle and Granger (1987). 
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10 An alternative model is the Autoregressive Distributed Lag, which was developed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) 
to apply when the series are integrated of different orders. This is not the case in our analysis. 
 
11 The former is used to test the null hypothesis that there are r cointegrating vectors against an alternative of there 
being at least r + 1, while the latter tests the null of r cointegrating vectors against the alternative of n. For the case 
where Π is a 2 × 2 matrix, the number of cointegration equations will be given by its (reduced) rank. With only two 
variables, the maximum rank possible is one which implies two testable hypotheses: H0: r = 0 against H1: r > 0, and 
also H0: r = 1 against H1: r >1. With three variables and a possible maximum rank of two, there are three testable 
hypotheses: First, H0: r = 0 against H1: r > 0; second, H0: r = 1 against H1: r > 1; and, H0: r = 2, against H1: r > 2. 
 
12 Both tests assume a linear deterministic trend in the data, an intercept (no trend) in the correction error and VAR 
and two lag-lengths. Moreover, the residual diagnostics of the estimated VAR and VEC models indicate the lack of 
serial correlation and heteroscedasticity, as desired. 
 
13  We adopt the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) procedure for the VAR model estimations, as the Wald test statistic does 
not follow its usual asymptotic Chi-square distribution under the null hypothesis when testing linear restrictions in the 
presence of possible non-stationary variables.  
 
14 We attach greater importance to the outcome of Test 1 whose underlying model includes all three variables thereby 
allowing us to examine the web of association between institutions and economic progress. The remaining tests are 
nonetheless useful in helping us to better interpret the results of Test 1. 
 
15 The reader is advised to visit https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/gove.12002 in order to download the 
file containing the relevant sources of law used in the construction of the indices. This document also details the key 
political and economic developments in Mozambique, which we use to contextualize and interpret our findings. 
 
16 Given the data’s persistence, we also visually inspect the residuals’ behavior before and after the years of interest to 
detect changes in magnitudes and/or trends, as this help us to better interpret what is happening around that time. 
 
17 Recall that these two variables jointly cause ECO (Test 1 in Table 3, shown as DEV and POL → ECO in Table 4). 
Recall also that POL is likely to be more influential as it alone is also individually significant, which further suggests 
we focus on events of a political nature. Note that the choice of these years is broadly consistent with those suggested 
for POL using model 3 (although POL does not cause DEV in this case). Model 2, meanwhile, highlights somewhat 
different dates for ECO, namely 1953 and 1958-59 and 1961 and 1967 (given that ECO causes DEV). 
 
18 ECO and DEV not only jointly cause POL but also individually in the three-variable test (Test 1 in Table 3, shown 
as DEV and ECO → POL in Table 4). However, neither ECO nor DEV cause POL in the two-variable tests (Test 2 
and 3 respectively). We also found that DEV causes ECO but not the other way round (Test 2), which is contrary to 
what was found for the colonial period. Significantly, the causality between ECO and POL is bi-directional (Test 4). 
 
19 Note that the ECO and POL variables are included in estimated equation together with their respective cointegrating 
vector-weights (of opposite signs). This relationship holds with equality in equilibrium, which we estimate to have 
occurred in 1986, given that this equation relies on inputs from the previous year. 
 
20 The regimes’ political authority over the masses was continuously constituted through authoritarian ideologies of 
‘development’, first in the form of the Estado Novo’s ‘civilizing mission’ entrusted to the Catholic Church, and later 
that of FRELIMO’s ‘New Man’ modernizing (and Marxist-Leninist) ideology (Sabaratnam, 2011:186). In terms of 
political economy, the continuities revolved around the co-operation between the state and large enterprises. The 
colonial state sought first to operate through large colonial companies, before taking them over directly as instruments 
of the Estado Novo, thereby securing monopolistic control of production and supporting its political economy. The 
post-independence policy essentially continued with this structure of ownership, in terms of investment coming from 
the state and profits being returned to the state, which was much more oriented towards the needs of the population 
than the colonial regime (Sabaratnam, 2011:188). As for public administration, both regimes were marked by 
41 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
substantial planning architectures in order to integrate the political reach of the state with the desired economic 
outcomes concerning production and autarchy, via their respective national development plans (Sabaratnam, 
2011:190). 
